Graham Potter was appointed Brighton & Hove Albion coach in May 2019 following the departure of Chris Hughton, with Chairman Tony Bloom citing Potter’s “attractive playing style” as one of the deciding factors in his appointment.
Brighton in the 19/20 season achieved plaudits from fans and pundits for their more possession-based style of football, achieving a 15th placed finish in the Premier League with their highest points tally of 41 points.
However, after over a year in charge, and £86million invested in new signings over two summers, a slow start to the 20/21 season (10 points from 10 games at the time of writing) makes you question whether Potter’s more “attractive” style is getting the best out of his squad.
In Possession
Shape
Although Potter is renowned for tweaking the Brighton system on a weekly basis, the shape in possession stays very similar. Brighton typically set up with a 3+2 shape at the back, both wingbacks will push very high, two players will tuck inside on the right and left between the lines and the striker will be central. Generally, the shape resembles a 3–4–2–1.
Patterns and Features
Potter has established a number of well rehearsed and effective patterns in possession.
Wingback to Winger: As aforementioned, two players will tuck inside (often two of Lallana, Trossard or Maupay). A common pattern for Brighton in getting into the CB-FB space in the channel is when the wingback receives, which will trigger a run into the channel from the man inside and a pass in behind the opponent fullback.
Central Combinations: Brighton are very willing to play into midfield early in build-up and like to progress the play centrally (Bissouma, Gross, White etc. very comfortable in possession). Upon receiving they will either look to play wide into the wingbacks who are dynamic going forward, or they will combine centrally with Lallana or Trossard who are good between the lines.
Quick switches: Another feature of Brighton’s play is sharp combinations on one side of the pitch before quickly switching to the wingback positioned on the far side. The far-side winger’s narrow positioning also pins the opposition fullback, giving more space and time upon receiving.
Bodies in the box: Potter’s side also pile bodies into the box during crosses, with the far-side wingback often seen attacking the far post (See March’s goal vs Man United).
3rd Man: Brighton also use 3rd man combinations when progressing centrally. Maupay is usually to one who drops to play the wall pass into the 3rd man.
Numbers
Brighton’s attack sits comfortably in the top half of the league from a numbers perspective. All ‘xG’ models have them placed highly (Understat, FBref and Gracenote Sports have them in the Top-10) when it comes to chance quality, whilst their 12.3 shots per game (as per Whoscored.com) is the 8th best in the league. They also control possession better than they did under Hughton, averaging 51.8% possession since the start of Potter’s reign.
Their goal totals, however, have not really matched up to these numbers, and similar ‘underperformance’ was seen last season relative to chance quality. Also, as you can see in the graph below, Maupay’s conversion rates last season were significantly worse than fellow strikers in the bottom half of the table. It’s quite interesting that those strikers who play for sides not widely acclaimed for their “attractive” style (Burnley, Hughton’s Brighton, although I’ve been harsh in including Sheffield United amongst these teams) convert their chances at far better rates. Perhaps there is an added psychological pressure, knowing that they must make the most of the few chances they do get. With Maupay, either this pressure to score isn’t as present (knowing he’ll get more chances), or he’s simply not as good a finisher.
Out of Possession
It was surprising to see how many issues Brighton have out of possession, especially in the defensive transitions and when they look to press their opponents high. Chris Hughton employed a zonal 4–4–2 out of possession in his two years at Brighton, which was incredibly well drilled and compact and limited the exposure of the centre-backs to difficult situations (9th best defence in the division in 17/18 and 11th best in 18/19). Potter’s focus on controlling possession has inevitably changed the conditions and situations in which their defenders find themselves in, and some of these are analysed below. In most games, they defend in a 5–3–2 block.
Isolated Centre-backs: In large contrast to Hughton’s defensive approach in relation to protecting the central defenders, there are countless examples this season of Brighton’s centre-backs being massively isolated in 1v1’s against attackers. The back three are constantly drawn into duels in the channel, which reduces the presence in the box and exposes them to situations in which they should be prevented from being in.
High Line: Regardless of whether Brighton are pressing, in shape, or in possession, the back three holds a very high line. When in the opposition final 3rd, they will boldly hold their line around the halfway line and sometimes follow their man deep into the opposition half. If the midfielders can’t shut-out the transition, the centre-backs are left covering massive spaces.
Lack of pressure on ball: The effects of Brighton’s high line are compounded by the lack of pressure they get on the ball when in the middle third. Dunk is also often drawn out centrally, leaving huge spaces inside and behind the side centre-backs for runners to attack.
Pressing Issues: Brighton commit their wingbacks very aggressively to their press, meaning the supporting centre-back on that side is constantly dragged wide or forward into situations where they are isolated near the touchline. The extent to which March and Lamptey are dragged out also creates a large disconnect between the CB-WB and acres of space for a runner to exploit.
Bodies in box: As aforementioned, although far-side wingback is encouraged to get into the box to attack crosses, this often leaves very little protection going the other way, compounding the problems with their high-line and the spaces to attack into depth.
Recovery runs: Both the pressing issues and the requirements to get into the box often mean that Lamptey/March are given even larger distances to recover on the defensive transitions, leaving them wrong side of their man. It’s no surprise therefore that Lamptey and March have conceded 34 fouls between them this season (7th and 19th highest respectively).
Numbers
When looking at Brighton’s numbers from a chance quality/xG perspective, again there is a significant underperformance according to multiple xG models (Understat, FBref, Gracenote and Opta/The Athletic). They are also the second best in the entire division when it comes to shots conceded. Perhaps they are simply unlucky, but the evidence above suggests that either directly or indirectly, the continuous exposure of the defence and the requirements in terms of space to cover will continue this “underperformance” from a defensive perspective. You could even argue that they have been lucky to not concede more from open-play in situations such as those above, when dangerous situations haven’t necessarily resulted it shots on goal.
Overall
Despite the plaudits from pundits, fans and those involved in analytics, there is a genuine question to be asked regarding whether the improvements in style and in-possession are actually maximising the strengths of this Brighton squad and delivering acceptable results. As the below illustrates, last season saw Brighton play through opponents at a far slower pace (Shot almost every 38 passes, almost identical to 18/19 under Hughton), and their opponents found it far easier to generate shots against their defence.
This season has seen improvements from a numbers point-of-view as per below. However, due to the manner in which Potter’s Brighton defend, these figures and frequency (or lack of) with which they concede shots may be “unsustainable”, and that in reality the defence as it is isn’t actually underperforming and any ‘luck’ going against them is a consequence of the high physical and mental demands Potter requires from his players over 90 minutes.
If this does happen, then the lack of improvement in an attacking sense, in combination with the lack of natural goalscorer (The addition of Welbeck, for all his qualities, is not that), may see Brighton in for another struggle, especially if sides such as Burnley start to convert chances at similar levels to previous seasons (11% average over the last three seasons).
Overall, Brighton are an interesting example of where improvements in terms of style don’t necessarily translate to points. Despite the evident improvements in possession with clearly defined patterns and principles, the trade-offs defensively may not suit the characteristics of the squad. Outside of the “attractive style”, a cynic would argue that Potter is not maximising the strengths of the squad any better than Hughton did. It will be interesting to see whether their numbers defensively, especially in relation to chance quality, number of shots against etc. holds up over the course of the season.
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